Are animals moral agents? In this article, a theologian and an anthropologist unite to bring the resources of each field to bear on this question. Alas, not all interdisciplinary conversations end harmoniously, and after much discussion the two authors find themselves in substantial disagreement over the answer. The article is therefore presented in two halves, one for each side of the argument. As well as presenting two different positions, our hope is that this article clarifies the different understandings of morality (...) in our respective fields and will help to offset confusion in interdisciplinary dialogue. In what follows, we each present our case. In the first section, Adam Willows argues that moral activity necessarily involves the use of reason, symbolic thought, and language and is on that basis an exclusively human affair. In the second, Marcus Baynes-Rock discusses his experience of relationality with other creatures; a relationality which, he argues, creates a shared understanding of obligations which are characteristically moral. (shrink)

Which systems/organisms are conscious? New tests for consciousness (‘C-tests’) are urgently needed. There is persisting uncertainty about when consciousness arises in human development, when it is lost due to neurological disorders and brain injury, and how it is distributed in nonhuman species. This need is amplified by recent and rapid developments in artificial intelligence (AI), neural organoids, and xenobot technology. Although a number of C-tests have been proposed in recent years, most are of limited use, and currently we have no (...) C-tests for many of the populations for which they are most critical. Here, we identify challenges facing any attempt to develop C-tests, propose a multidimensional classification of such tests, and identify strategies that might be used to validate them. (shrink)

A volume in the SUNY series in Philosophy George R. Lucas Jr., editor.

This volume is a Festschrift in honor of Jacques Taminiaux and examines the primacy of the political within phenomenology. These objectives support each other, in that Taminiaux's own intellectual itinerary brought him increasingly to an affirmation of the importance of the political. Divided into four sections, the essays contained in this volume engage with different aspects of the political dimension of phenomenology: its dialogue with classic texts of political philosophy, the political facets of phenomenological praxis, phenomenology’s contribution to actual political (...) debates, and the impact of Taminiaux’s work in the shaping of phenomenology’s notion of politics. The phrase “the primacy of the political” echoes the “primacy of perception” as it was famously defined by Merleau-Ponty. This book emphasizes, however, the inescapability of the political rather than its “foundational” character, i.e. the fact that various itineraries of thought, explored in different fields of phenomenological research, give rise to politically relevant reflections. It points out and elucidates political connotations that haunt phenomenological concepts, such as ‘world’, ‘self’, ‘nature’, ‘intersubjectivity, or ‘language’, and traces them to a broad range of approaches, concepts, and methods. In its explorations, the book discusses a broad range of thinkers, including, but not limited to, Aristotle and Kant, Bergson, Husserl, Heidegger, Merleau-Ponty, Gadamer, Ricoeur, and Arendt. (shrink)

_An in-depth examination of the nature of Kant's causal principle._.

Given Hume's theory of belief and belief production it is no small task to explain how it is possible for a belief in a miracle to be produced. I argue that belief in a miracle cannot be produced through Hume's standard causal mechanisms and that although education, passion, and testimony initially seem to be promising mechanisms for producing belief in a miracle, none of these is able to produce the belief in a miracle. I conclude by explaining how this poses (...) a problem for Hume's theory of belief and I briefly investigate the alternatives available for solving this problem. (shrink)

Given Hume’s theory of belief and belief production it is no small task to explain how it is possible for a belief in a miracle to be produced. I argue that belief in a miracle cannot be produced through Hume’s standard causal mechanisms and that although education, passion, and testimony initially seem to be promising mechanisms for producing belief in a miracle, none of these is able to produce the belief in amiracle. I conclude by explaining how this poses a (...) problem for Hume’s theory of belief and I briefly investigate the alternatives available for solving this problem. (shrink)

In the broadest sense, Propositionalism is the view that knowing how to do something first requires our possessing appropriate propositional attitudes about an action. Non-propositionalism concerning knowing how, is the rejection of propositionalism. This distinction, and the rejection of propositionalism is typically traced back to Gilbert Ryle. In the 21st century, propositionalists have tried to turn the tables with a quick and decisive argument against non-propositionalism. According to the argument from pervasive inability, since (1) There are numerous cases in which (...) someone knows how to do something while possessing a pervasive inability to perform the action she knows how to do, and (2) these cases can be unproblematically explained to be instances of knowing how by propositionalism, but (3) these cases cannot be explained to be instances of knowing how by non-propositionalism, therefore (4) non-propositionalism must be rejected in favor of propositionalism. In this paper, through a careful examination of proposed cases, I argue that premise two is not true, and by correcting propositionalists’ mischaracterization of non-propositionalism, I argue that premise three is also not true. As a result, the argument from pervasive inability fails to provide a decision between propositionalism and non-propositionalism concerning knowing how. (shrink)

Consciousness has a number of puzzling features. One such feature is its unity: the experiences and other conscious states that one has at a particular time seem to occur together in a certain way. I am currently enjoying visual experiences of my computer screen, auditory experiences of bird-song, olfactory experiences of coffee, and tactile experiences of feeling the ground beneath my feet. Conjoined with these perceptual experiences are proprioceptive experiences, experiences of agency, affective and emotional experiences, and conscious thoughts of (...) various kinds. These experiences are unified in a variety of ways, but the kind of unity that I’m interested in here concerns their phenomenal character. Take just two of these experiences: the sound of bird-song and the smell of coffee. There is something it is like to have the auditory experience, there is something it is like to have the olfactory experience, and there is something it is like to have both the auditory and olfactory experiences together. These two experiences occur as parts or components or aspects of a larger, more complex experience. And what holds of these two experiences seems to hold – at least in normal contexts – of all of one’s simultaneous experiences: they seem to be subsumed by a single, maximal experience.2 We could think of this maximal experience as an experiential perspective on the world. What it is like to be me right now is (or involves) an extremely complex conscious state that subsumes the various simpler experiences that I outlined above (seeing my computer screen, hearing bird-song, smelling coffee, and so on). I will follow recent literature in using the term “co-consciousness” for the relation that a set of conscious states bear to each other when they have a complex phenomenology (Bayne and Chalmers 2003; Dainton 2000; Hurley 1998; Lockwood 1989). (shrink)

Merleau-Ponty's phenomenological ontology engages deeply with visual art, and this aspect of his work remains significant not only to philosophers, but also to artists, art theorists, and critics. Until recently, scholarly attention has been focused on the artists he himself was inspired by and wrote about, chiefly Cézanne, Klee, Matisse, and Rodin. Merleau-Ponty at the Gallery expands and shifts the focus to address a range of artists (Giorgio Morandi, Kiki Smith, Cy Twombly, Joan Mitchell, and Ellsworth Kelly) whose work came (...) to prominence in the second half of the twentieth century and thus primarily after the philosopher's death. Véronique M. Fóti does not confine her analyses to Merleau-Ponty's texts (which now importantly include his late lecture courses), but also engages directly with the art. Of particular concern to her is the art's ethical bearing, especially as related to animal and vegetal life. The book's concluding chapter addresses the still-widespread rejection of beauty as an aesthetic value. (shrink)

al-juzʼ al-awwal. Muḥāwalāt ʻulūm al-insān wa-manahajuhā fī fahm al-insān -- al-juzʼ al-thānī. Madākhil al-fikr wa-al-thaqāfah fī fahm al-insān -- al-juzʼ al-thālith. Muqārabāt ʻilm al-insān al-mutakhaṣṣiṣ fī fahm al-insān wa-maʻālim taʼsīs al-badīl, qirāʼah fī ʻilm al-Anthrūbūlūjiyā al-ḥadīth.

Author's interpretation on Kinh Dịch in Vietnam.

Peygamber efendimizin vefatından sonra tarih seyri içerisinde İslami ilimler Müslümanların çabalarıyla yavaş yavaş oluşmuştur. Bu oluşum sürecinde hiç şüphesiz belirli sınıfların büyük etkisi olmuştur. İlmi sohbetlerin icra edildiği ve kitapların yazıldığı imla meclisleri, kitap kopya eden-çoğaltan ve temize çeken verraklar ve müstensihler sınıfı İslam medeniyetine büyük katkıları olan sınıflardır. Biz çalışmamızda bahsi geçen sınıflara dair temel ve özet bilgiler sunduk. Akabinde de verrakçılık ve verraklara dair yapılan çalışmaları, yazım araç ve gereçlerine dair yapılan çalışmaları, hat ve hattatlığa dair çalışmaları, kitap (...) ve tedvine dair çalışmaları künyeleri ile vererek bibliyografik bir çalışma oluşturduk. Gayemiz, henüz üzerinde çalışma yapılmamış bu konu hakkında ilgililere kaynak sunmaktır. (shrink)

“Risk” is all about living a faith filled life. Within the pages of this work you will discover the year-by-year history of the ups and downs of the happenings regarding Foursquare Church. There are no sure things in this crazy epic journey called life. The only constant we can hang our hope upon is the name of Jesus. Christ has called us to live beyond what we can see and lean only to what He has said. In the parable of (...) the talents Jesus was very clear about how He felt regarding those who would not risk. In Matthew 25:28-30 He states, “‘Take the thousand and give it to the one who risked the most and get rid of this “play-it-safe-mentality” who won’t go out on a limb. Jesus rewards those who Risk. Foursquare Church and its history is one successive detail regarding progressive risking on God and his faithfulness to reward said risk. I invite you to read and risk on God. You will find great joy in discovering the rewards of a life that is lived by faith. (shrink)